This article considers the measurement of market power and approaches to mitigate market power for electricity generation in the US and the EU. Analysis of electricity market power is difficult because demand is inelastic and substitution possibilities are limited across time and space. We propose Competitive Residual Demand analysis, which measures the incentive of a generator to increase price above marginal cost under the assumption that other generators act competitively. Competitive Residual Demand analysis has the advantage that it is transparent and can be repeated relatively easily for different demand conditions and geographic markets.
I. Introduction
Analysis of electricity market power can be a daunting task because electricity sales affect prices in many different markets. Electricity demand is inelastic and the product is not easily stored, hence generators can have market power at a moment in time even if markets are competitive at other times. Furthermore, separate geographic markets can exist at locations that are not distant from each other if transmission constraints limit the ability of a consumer to substitute electricity from a different region.
Several wholesale electricity power pools, such as the Pennsylvania-New JerseyMaryland (PJM) pool, operate markets for electricity in which generators submit day-ahead bids for electricity supplies for each hour of the next day. The PJM also solicits real-time bids to balance supply and demand in each hour of the day. 1 Market power concerns can arise in any of these hourly markets. A thorough analysis of the competitive effects of market power in the PJM region should consider price impacts in 8,760 day-ahead markets and another 8,760 realtime markets for each year. Changes in supply and demand conditions can affect prices in any of these markets.
In addition to these 17,520 annual product markets, transmission constraints can create separate geographic markets, each of which can have 17,520 separate product markets per year.
If transmission capacity limits the flow of electricity into a region, or if transmission losses impose significant costs on electricity flows, then the existence of competitive electricity producers in one region may not constrain prices in another region.
This article discusses electricity market power issues in the US and EU and describes approaches to evaluate and mitigate market power. They range from relatively simple calculations of market concentration to sophisticated game-theoretic models of bidding behaviour. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission employs market share and pivotal supplier tests to screen for market power. If an applicant for market-based pricing passes both tests, the FERC makes a rebuttable presumption that the applicant does not possess significant market power in generation. The more sophisticated models can produce point estimates of equilibrium prices, but suffer the disadvantage that they are not transparent and must be replicated for the many markets in which generators can affect prices. This article proposes an alternative approach called Competitive Residual Demand (CRD) analysis, which estimates the residual demand facing a firm under the assumption that other firms in the market behave as perfect competitors. Competitive Residual Demand analysis provides insights into the factors that may cause a firm to choose a price significantly above marginal cost and can be replicated relatively easily for different market conditions. We show by example that CRD analysis can identify electricity market power under conditions that satisfy the FERC market share and pivotal supplier tests.
Section II describes different approaches that have been employed to identify and measure electricity market power. These range from simple concentration measures and the pivotal supplier test adopted by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to sophisticated equilibrium bidding models. This section introduces Competitive Residual Demand analysis and argues that it has certain advantages compared to other approaches to identify electricity market power. Section III considers approaches to mitigate market power that have been used in US. These include tests for market-based pricing employed by the FERC and by regional transmission organizations such as the PJM Interconnection. Section IV considers the EU perspective on electricity market power and emphasizes the different scope for antitrust policy in the EU and the US. Compared to the US, the EU has been more complacent about electricity market power, which may reflect a greater ability to challenge abuse of market power under EU antitrust laws. This section also briefly notes that allowances created to limit CO 2 emissions increase the price of electricity in the EU and are likely to have larger impacts with higher natural gas prices. Section V offers some concluding remarks on the merits of competitive residual demand analysis.
II. Approaches to Electricity Market Power Analysis
Approaches to evaluate market power in electricity generation vary from relatively simple calculations to elaborate simulations of market performance. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission employs a simple screen to test for the absence of market power.
The screen consists of two tests: a market share test and a pivotal supplier test. An applicant passes the market share test if its uncommitted capacity is less than 20 percent of the total uncommitted capacity of the relevant market. An applicant passes the pivotal supplier test if its uncommitted capacity is less than the uncommitted capacity reserve margin. applicant passes the pivotal supplier test, the market has sufficient capacity to meet demand even if the applicant makes no sales. An applicant that fails the pivotal supplier test can demand a price above the competitive price and be assured of making some sales.
If an applicant passes both tests, the FERC makes a rebuttable presumption that the applicant does not possess significant market power in generation. If an applicant fails either the market share or the pivotal supplier test, it can rebut a presumption of market power by offering evidence based on a delivered price test or by filing a mitigation proposal that would eliminate the ability to exercise market power, or the applicant can forego market-based pricing authority and accept cost-based rates.
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The advantage of the FERC market power screen is that it is relatively easy for regulators and courts to apply. The analysis merely requires an estimate of demand and load commitments and a list of the capacities of generating plants that can serve the demand. The disadvantage of the FERC market power screen is that it can easily produce both type I and type II errors. A firm can fail the test yet not have the power to charge prices that are significantly above marginal production costs, or pass the test and have the power to charge a price significantly above marginal cost. The risks are limited because parties can intervene in FERC proceedings and challenge a determination that a generator passes or fails the market power screens.
The pivotal supplier test can be strengthened in straightforward ways to reduce the probability that a generator would be permitted to exercise market power. The PJM Interconnection employs a three-pivotal supplier test to determine when generators are reasonably likely to behave in a competitive manner. PJM is a regional transmission organization that coordinates and monitors wholesale electricity trades in a large part of the eastern US. A local market passes the PJM test if there is sufficient generation to satisfy demand after removing the output of the three largest suppliers. The PJM includes in this calculation all available output with an incremental cost less than or equal to 1.5 times the clearing price.
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Market share and pivotal supplier tests allow a quick look to determine whether one or more generators have the ability to increase price by reducing output. These tests, 3 Ibid., at 23.
however, do not determine whether it would be profitable for a supplier to raise prices, nor do they inform the expected level of prices in a local market.
Consider the following hypothetical. An electricity supplier (Alpha) has 800 MW of uncommitted capacity. Peak wholesale demand is 5,000 MW and total uncommitted industry capacity is 6,300 MW. Alpha passes the FERC market share screen and the pivotal supplier test. The supplier accounts for less than 20 percent of peak sales and its share of total uncommitted capacity is even less. Furthermore, supply from other firms is sufficient to meet demand. The uncommitted wholesale market has a reserve margin of 1,300 MW, which exceeds the firm's capacity of 800 MW. Despite the fact that the generator passes the FERC market power screen, there is a risk that the firm can exercise significant market power. The example in Figure 1 shows that firm Alpha has the ability to reduce output and raise the market price, but it does not establish that the firm would profit by doing so. To understand whether a firm would raise prices by exercising market power requires a more sophisticated analysis of market interactions. The Nash-Cournot model of oligopolistic competition is a leading example of relatively simple approaches to estimate electricity market power. 5 This workhorse of industrial organisation economics assumes that each supplier chooses its output level (in each hour) to maximise its profits given the residual demand it faces (total demand less net imports and the outputs of other suppliers) assuming that other suppliers are simultaneously and independently determining their output levels.
For a market with N generators, each of which has constant marginal production costs, the Nash-Cournot model predicts that the ratio of profits to sales is proportional to an index of market concentration divided by the market elasticity of demand. Specifically,
where П is total profit and R is total sales in the market, η is the magnitude of the market elasticity of demand, and H is the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index of market concentration. The
where s j is the j th generator's output share. 6 With Nash-Cournot competition, profits can be significant in unconcentrated markets because the elasticity of demand for electricity is very low. For example, suppose that H = 0.1 (corresponding to ten identical generators) and the 5 A recent example of the use of such models in potential merger analysis is Moselle, Newbery and Harris (2006) , undertaken for the Dutch Competition Authority, NMa. An earlier example applied to California is given in Borenstein et al. (2002) . 6 Here the market shares are expressed as fractions, so H is a number between 0 and 1. In other applications the market shares are expressed as percentages, in which case H is a number between 0 and 10,000.
elasticity of demand is 0.2. Nash-Cournot competition with constant marginal costs predicts that total market profits would equal 50 percent of total sales.
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An obvious objection to the Nash-Cournot assumption that suppliers choose outputs is that suppliers actually offer to supply amounts at various prices, and leave the market to determine how much of their offer to accept. One way of finessing this mismatch between the strategy choices assumed and observed is to suppose that suppliers offer amounts at prices (which might be variable costs or a mark-up above variable cost to cover various fixed costs)
up to a fixed amount that they determine. This maximum amount offered to the market would be the key short-run decision variable for strategic suppliers, and would be the total available capacity for a competitive fringe. Given the marginal cost function of each supplier, the strategies would then be the maximum outputs to offer in each hour, and this would determine the market-clearing price.
A more sophisticated approach to evaluate the ability to exploit market power in electricity markets is to estimate an equilibrium model of price formation for each relevant wholesale market. If generators submit hourly bids to a centralised pool, then an equilibrium model would estimate each supplier's bid price and quantity for each hour. In these bidding models, the estimated equilibrium bids typically have the Nash property that each supplier's bid maximises its expected profit given the bids that are optimal for all other suppliers. Such
Supply Function Equilibrium models were developed by Green and Newbery (1992) to compare alternative market structures for the England and Wales generation markets. These alternative market designs were choices facing the UK Government when restructuring the Central Electricity Generating Board before privatisation. Hortacsu and Puller (2006) construct a supply function model for the Texas ERCOT wholesale electricity market. They estimate a bid function for each supplier that determines the supplier's optimal bid price conditional on expected bids by other suppliers, using as data the actual demand and observed bids supplied to the System Operator.
The advantage of these equilibrium bid models is that they are firmly grounded in price theory. In these models each supplier is doing all it can to maximise its profit given the behaviour of other suppliers. These models, however, have a number of disadvantages. They are complex because they require estimation of optimal bids for each relevant product market 7 Industry equilibrium in the Cournot-Nash oligopoly requires that the largest firm's market share be less the market elasticity of demand, which in turn implies that H/η is less than one.
and a computational search for bids that are best responses to all other bids. More troubling, there may be a continuum of equilibrium bids, so that observing that one set of bids is an equilibrium does not tightly constrain possible future equilibria. This is a particular concern if circumstances change (as they would, for example, with a merger). 8 Furthermore, the approach is usually static; bid strategies do not account for the possibility that current bids may affect future bidding behaviour.
A key variable for the analysis of market power is the extent of forward contracting, which has a potentially very significant impact on spot market bids. 9 If a producer is completely hedged (i.e. he has sold as much power forward as he expects to generate) then his optimal spot bid is marginal cost, regardless of other bids. If the spot price is less than his short-run marginal cost, he is better off reducing output and buying in the spot market to meet his contractual obligations, avoiding the higher marginal cost of generation, and vice versa. If he has sold forward more than his expected generation, he has an incentive to drive the spot price below marginal cost, as he will be a net buyer in the spot market to discharge his contract position. Only if he is under-contracted does he have an incentive to drive the spot price above marginal cost, and his profit is limited to the difference between his output and his contract position. If this is small, then the incentive to exercise market power is also small. Hortacsu and Puller (2006) estimate current contract positions from the point of intersection of bids with marginal costs.
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It is possible to estimate dynamic bidding strategies, but these add additional layers of complexity. Allaz and Vila (1993) model the choice of forward sales in a Nash-Cournot duopoly model and show that the extent of forward cover depends on the number of contract rounds, assuming full disclosure of contract positions after each round. In the limit as the 8 There are various ways of reducing the set of possible equilibria, most directly by assuming that incumbents are restrained by the threat of entry (Newbery, 1998) . However, entry in electricity markets can be difficult to predict and may not be effective in the short to medium run.
9 Most spot markets are actually cleared some time before supply and demand are realised (either day-ahead or within the day at least an hour before "gate closure"). An example is the day-ahead market conducted by the PJM Interconnection.
10 Yet another complication is that most spot markets require bids and offers to take the form of a ladder or step function, rather than a smooth curve from which optimal bids are most readily derived. Hortacsu and Puller (2006) smooth the step function to derive differentiable curves, but there are concerns that this may not produce optimal bids. This problem can be handled once it is accepted that market participants bid in expectation of the realised residual demand schedule, but the econometrics are considerably more demanding, as Wolak (2003) shows.
number of rounds increases, market power diminishes to zero. If contract positions are not revealed, then market power remains. It is possible to extend this model to any number of firms. In the symmetric case with constant costs and linear demand, when contract positions are not revealed, the contract cover will be 1-H, where H is the Herfindal Hirshman Index expressed as a fraction. A further complication is that in repeated games (and electricity markets are repeated at high frequency) contract positions can be used to support collusive behaviour (Green and Le Coq, 2006) .
Sophisticated equilibrium bidding models have a mixed record in tracking actual bidding behaviour in real markets. Hortacsu and Puller (2006) found that the bids of smaller firms in the ERCOT wholesale market differed significantly from the theoretical benchmark of static profit-maximisation in their bidding model.
All of these modelling approaches suffer from the additional disadvantage that they are not particularly transparent when properly calibrated to replicate the complexities of generation plants and markets, which limits their value in a regulatory proceeding or a court of law. The models generate point estimates of market prices, but do not explain the incentives that lead firms to choose prices significantly above marginal production costs. The answers to these questions lie deep within the apparatus of the model and do not emerge as part of the output of the model.
To gain more insight about the incentives of a firm to exercise market power we propose a simulation method that we call Competitive Residual Demand (CRD) analysis. CRD analysis examines the residual demand facing a firm and computes the incentive for a firm to charge a price above marginal cost. The residual demand is the uncommitted wholesale market demand less the aggregate uncommitted supply from all other firms. As a further simplification, the market demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. The market demand is then independent of prices, but will differ at different points in time.
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The aggregate supply of all firms depends on their conduct, specifically whether they act competitively or reduce their outputs below competitive levels in order to benefit from higher prices. The CRD approach assumes that all other firms act competitively, in which case the 11 Baker and Bresnahan (1988) estimate the slope of the residual demand faced by firms selling differentiated products. Their focus is on estimation of supply and firm-specific demand functions with limited cost information. The competitive residual demand approach assumes that demand is fixed at any point in time and uses known industry marginal costs to estimate residual demands for the merging firms and to compute profit-maximizing prices.
supply of each firm is the output that equates the firm's marginal cost to the market price. The assumption of competitive conduct for all other firms is not unreasonable when other firms are small and are unlikely to have significant market power. An alternative approach could assume that other firms add a bid margin to their marginal costs.
The CRD analysis computes the market-clearing price and the firm's profits under different demand assumptions and for different levels of the firm's output. Given the industry marginal cost schedule in Figure 1 and assuming market demand of 5000 MW, Table 1 shows the market-clearing price and firm Alpha's profit for different levels of output relative to no supply restriction. Alpha's total installed capacity in this example is 800 MW. When Alpha operates at its full capacity, the market-clearing price is $32.5/MWh and the firm earns profit at the rate of $13,800 per hour. The market-clearing price increases if Alpha reduces its output, with the price increasing more as its output decreases. If Alpha cuts its output in half to 400MW, the market-clearing price would increase by 54 percent, from $32.5/MWh to $50/MWh. But such a large cut in output would not be profitable; Alpha's profit would fall from $13,800 to $11,800 on a flow basis, a drop of 14 percent. Table 1 shows that Alpha would profit only from an output reduction of 100 MW.
Larger output reductions would not be profitable. When Alpha produces at a level of 700 MW with 100 MW of idle capacity, the market-clearing price is 11 percent higher than the perfectly competitive level and its profit is slightly higher than it would be with no output reduction.
Although other supply reductions lead to higher prices, they are not profitable and therefore are not likely to be chosen.
Alpha would qualify for market-based pricing under the FERC market power screen, because the firm passes both the market share and the pivotal supplier tests. 12 Nonetheless, the CRD analysis shows that Alpha has an incentive to reduce output by 100 MW, which would result in a price increase of 11 percent above the perfectly competitive level under the assumption that all other firms act competitively. A price increase is likely despite the fact that the market in this example is relatively unconcentrated: the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index of concentration in this hypothetical market is less than 1,000 (based on the sum of the squares of output shares expressed as percentages). By reducing output, Alpha can increase price significantly because the industry marginal cost curve has a steep slope in the neighbourhood of the competitive output. Furthermore, Alpha has enough capacity to reduce output and still have substantial sales that benefit from the higher price. The slope of the marginal cost curve is critical. If marginal costs were only $1/MWh less for industry outputs above the perfectly competitive level, Alpha would have no incentive to reduce its output. Table 2 shows that any output reduction lowers Alpha's profits if industry marginal costs are slightly lower. On the other hand, if marginal costs were $2.5/MWh more for industry outputs above the perfectly competitive level, Table 3 shows that Alpha would profit by reducing its output by either 100 MW or 200 MW. The former would result in a price that is 18 percent above the perfectly competitive level and the latter would result in a price that is 25 percent higher.
Nonetheless, it is more likely that Alpha would reduce its output by 100 MW rather than 200 MW because the smaller output reduction is more profitable. Computationally, the competitive residual demand analysis is considerably easier than a full equilibrium analysis. Moreover, it can be repeated to estimate prices in many different time periods, corresponding to different demand states. The analysis also can be repeated relatively easily to reflect supply conditions in different geographic markets.
The competitive residual demand analysis has its deficiencies. It is not an equilibrium analysis; the CRD approach estimates only the incentive of a firm to raise price above the competitive level. The CRD analysis assumes perfectly competitive behaviour by all other firms and does not take into account possible price reactions by other firms. CRD analysis is sufficient to identify a risk that a generator would exercise significant market power if all firms in the market act as perfect competitors or as suppliers of strategic complements. 13 If other firms act as perfect competitors, then their prices are completely determined by their marginal costs and they would not react to a higher price by the merged firm. In that case the partial CRD analysis is sufficient to determine the firm's pricing decision. CDR analysis is also sufficient to identify a risk that a firm will exercise market power if it indicates an incentive for the firm to choose a price that is significantly above its marginal production cost and other generators act as suppliers 13 The products of the firms are strategic complements if an increase in the price chosen by one of the firms increases the optimal prices chosen by other firms. Products are strategic substitutes under Nash-Cournot competition; other firms would increase output in response to any reduction in output of the merged firm and this would tend to depress prices.
of strategic complements. In this case reactions by other firms are likely to result in even higher prices.
III. Market Power Mitigation in the US
Even a thorough analysis of the potential for market power in electricity markets can overlook possibilities for firms to exploit market power in some scenarios. Demand may increase more than expected. Supply outages can occur. Transmission constraints can isolate geographic regions from external sources of supplies, allowing generators with access to the region to increase prices. Well-designed electricity markets should have regulatory measures to mitigate market power if situations arise that give firms excessive market power.
Under the Federal Power Act 1935, the FERC has a statutory obligation to ensure that wholesale prices are "just and reasonable". If an electricity supplier wishes to sell at marketdetermined wholesale prices, this will be only allowed providing "the seller (and each of its affiliates) does not have, or has adequately mitigated, market power in generation and transmission and cannot erect other barriers to entry." 14 The FERC assumes that market pricing is "just and reasonable" if the market is competitive. The FERC applies the market share and pivotal supplier tests described in the previous section to establish a rebuttable presumption that an applicant for market-based pricing does not possess significant market power.
A reason for concern that markets are competitive when they are liberalised is that any FERC-approved form of pricing restricts competition authorities from intervening because the FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale electricity rates. In addition, US antitrust laws are relatively powerless to prevent excessive pricing, absent other anticompetitive conduct.
"Antitrust remedies are thus not well-suited to address problems of market power in the electric power industry that result from existing high levels of concentration in generation." (DOE, 2000) .
Experience with the ill-fated deregulated California market suggests, however, that the FERC market power screen does not prevent the exercise of significant market power and that the FERC might apply a high threshold for intervention in the presence of market power.
Not long after electricity deregulation in California, a combination of increases in demand, inadequate supply, retail price controls, and market manipulation led to dramatic price increases. Over a period of about six months, average monthly prices surged from about $30/MWh to over $300/MWh. The Independent System Operator that governed wholesale trades in California lacked formal measures to mitigate the exercise of market power. Absent such measures, California state regulators turned to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for help. The FERC, however, declined to intervene.
California regulators and ratepayers also attempted to use the antitrust laws to address the market power issues that arose in the deregulated California electricity market. These efforts were generally fruitless. The mere exercise of market power, when market power is lawfully obtained, absent conduct that excludes competition, is not a violation of the U.S. Sherman Act.
Courts also rejected attempts to apply California business law to conduct in the deregulated electricity market, under the principle that the FERC had jurisdiction over California wholesale electricity rates even though the FERC chose not to intervene in the California market.
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California eventually resolved the crisis by entering into long-term contracts for additional supplies at great expense.
The Federal Power Act notes that the authority to sell at market-determined prices can be withdrawn and replaced by regulated prices if there is "any change in status that would reflect a departure from the characteristics the Commission has relied upon in approving market-based pricing." 16 However, even competitive electricity prices occasionally have to reach high levels if they are to cover the costs of peaking generators that may only be required for a few hours each year. Distinguishing between necessarily high but remunerative and competitive prices and those emerging from the unjustifiable exercise of market power is likely to be difficult, particularly if these scarcity prices only occur in a small fraction of years.
Other wholesale electricity markets have formal procedures for intervention when generators have unanticipated market power. The market monitor for the PJM Interconnection has rules for capping offer prices when conditions on a transmission system create a structurally non-competitive local market. The PJM market monitor may cap the offer price for a unit if total available generation is not sufficient to relieve a binding transmission constraint after excluding supply by the owner of the unit and the two other largest suppliers (the three-pivotal supplier test). 17 In making this supply assessment the market monitor includes only units available at an effective cost no greater than 150% of the cost-based market-clearing price for the region affected by the transmission constraint. 18 Units that are offer-capped more than 80 percent of their run hours are capped at a price equal to either incremental cost plus 10% or incremental cost plus $40/MWh, or an agreed upon price.
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The PJM test for a structurally non-competitive market is more rigorous than the FERC market power screen. It extends the FERC pivotal supplier test to encompass the two largest suppliers in the market in addition to the applicant and includes only economic capacity in its market assessment. Furthermore, the PJM market power test applies to any region affected by a binding transmission constraint at any time of the year.
There is a difficult balance to strike between using formal regulation versus market forces to police wholesale electricity markets. If the FERC has a duty to intervene whenever prices appear unjust and unreasonable, then many of the apparent advantages of liberalisation may be lost. Indeed, Wolak reaches the conclusion that "FERC must regulate, rather than simply monitor, wholesale electricity markets" (Griffin and Puller, 2005, p.178) , which would seem to defeat the purpose of liberalisation. An alternative that permits greater regulatory flexibility is expanded use of mitigation measures at the local level designed and implemented by regional transmission organizations, which can be tailored to the unique characteristics and requirements of local wholesale markets. While organizations such as the PJM Interconnection appear to have pursued market power mitigation policies with considerable success, only time will tell whether they strike the right balance between regulatory intervention and a free market.
IV. Market Power Mitigation in the EU
Competition policies in the US and the EU govern the exercise of market power in different ways. In the US, provided a firm acquires a dominant position legally (by innovation, superior efficiency or foresight) and does not act to exclude competition or leverage its market power into other markets, it is free to exercise market power that results from its 17 See PJM Market Implementation Committee, 3-Pivotal Supplier Test Overview and Implementation Timeline, February 27, 2006. dominant position. In the EU in contrast, it is illegal under Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome for firms with a dominant position (exercised either singly or collectively) to abuse their market power 20 by charging excessive prices, although proving that prices are excessive requires evidence that the margins of prices above costs are well above the normal commercial range for competitive firms producing the same product, which is not an easy test to apply in any market, let alone in electricity markets.
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The interpretations of the EU competition laws (especially Article 82) give a list of facilitating conditions that give rise to the potential for joint market dominance, almost all of which are satisfied in many EU electricity markets. Consequently, generating companies must be somewhat cautious in their exercise of market power, but how cautious is unclear.
Specifically, the short-run elasticity of demand can be very low in the short periods during which scarcity can arise (because of an outage, or extreme demand conditions) and the market-clearing price can reach very high levels (certainly well above $1000 /MWh). Just how high it is acceptable to allow prices to reach, given the need to cover fixed costs from a small number of very profitable hours, is a matter for the firms to judge and may vary across jurisdictions with differing attitudes to anti-trust enforcement.
20 "The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition." ( Deregulation in the United States was in principle a cautious relaxation of regulatory control over prices, with considerable awareness of the potential problems of market power, although with notable exceptions such as the experience in California. Electricity restructuring in
Europe has tended to overlook issues of market power and instead has concentrated on introducing wholesale and often retail markets in the expectation that they will be naturally competitive. In part this reflects the political dynamics of liberalisation, where Britain was an enthusiastic proponent first of privatisation, and then, somewhat belatedly, of competition to restrain the privatised monopolies. Most Continental countries were happy with their existing energy structures, and would only accept EU Energy Directives that allowed them to retain their existing market structures with minimal change. If the Commission had followed the US approach of allowing liberalisation only after any concerns about potential market power had been addressed, then it is doubtful that energy market liberalisation would have occurred in more than a few countries, and probably would have faltered at the first sign of trouble (e.g. after the California crisis).
The Commission may have been prepared to accept the consequential failure to create competitive structures because of the power of Article 82, which allows the possession, but not the abuse, of market power. In that respect they may have been unduly sanguine about the ability or willingness of member states to detect and address abuses. Figure 2 shows that most Continental markets remain highly concentrated, whether measured by concentration ratios or the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index. These measures may overstate or understate market power as they ignore import capacity and other factors that affect equilibrium prices. Nonetheless, the numbers raise potential concerns about the possible exercise of market power in most Continental electricity markets.
Many EU countries appear to lack the necessary powers and institutions to ensure that generation becomes adequately competitive. National regulators often lack the right to automatically receive the kind of information that would allow them to detect the abuse of market power. 22 Instead, they often have to collect circumstantial evidence (from price spikes or industry complaints) before they can refer a company or sector (e.g. generation) for investigation by the national competition authorities that have the legal power to collect such information. 24 The regulatory authority, CNE was divided in its judgment of this case, although the European Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, considered that the case justified a change in EC merger rules to permit the Commission to examine such mergers (European Power Daily, 16 Nov 2005) . This represents a change in the Commission's stance compared with the earlier Ruhrgas merger, where the Commission was less active in contesting the merger even though it had considerably larger impacts on other member states, given the central role of Germany in cross-border trade in both electricity and gas. 25 Article 17 of the Regulation deals with Article 81 and 82 infringements (Investigations into sectors of the economy and into types of agreements). Where the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the common market, the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular type of agreements across various sectors. In the course of that inquiry, the Commission may request the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that purpose. The Commission may in particular request the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to communicate to it all agreements, decisions and concerted practices. (European Commission, 2004). Thus the Commission can propose structural remedies for current or past abuses and these would appear to be particularly relevant in dealing with market power in energy markets. Article 7 of the Regulation states that "Where the Commission, acting on a complaint or on its own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of Article 81 or of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or structural remedies that are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. If the Commission has a legitimate interest in doing so, it may also find that an infringement has been committed in the past." (European Commission, 2004 ).
Concentration in EU Electricity
An optimistic interpretation would be that the Commission will eventually be able to follow the British model, in which liberalisation is interpreted to mean that market solutions are to be preferred where feasible, and regulation confined to natural monopoly components (and only so long as they remain natural monopolies).
26 If the unregulated sectors are to function efficiently, their ability to abuse market power needs to be restrained, either by regulation (behavioural remedies) or by structural remedies. The US experience with electricity deregulation suggests that regulation to inhibit market power is likely to require Thus in telecommunications, the Communications Directives require National Regulatory Authorities to conduct market reviews and to determine which markets shall be deemed to be effectively competitive, and which markets are susceptible to ex ante regulation. The cumulative effect of these Directives is to limit regulation to those markets where competition law would be inadequate, and then further to restrict the scope of regulation to the minimum justifiable level.
The Californian evidence might suggest that any behavioural remedy to address the abuse of market power in deregulated electricity markets "would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy" (EC, 2004) , opening the prospect of (gradually) restructuring the EU energy sectors to create sufficiently numerous competing firms in each market that their pursuit of profits did not amount to market abuse. The model would be the British electricity market that may have finally reached a satisfactory structure by 2000, shortly before the start of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (Newbery, 2005a) .
Whether this new activism will result in workably competitive electricity markets and lead to a more rigorous and sceptical treatment of market power in the electricity sector either by member Competition Authorities or directly by the Commission remains to be seen.
Market Power and the Emissions Trading System
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) limits CO 2 emissions from covered sectors, especially electricity (accounting for about 56% of the total). In order to persuade companies and governments to agree to the ETS, companies, especially generating companies, were given free allocations of EU Emission Allowances (EUAs) for about 95% of their baseline emissions.
As economists predicted, the market price of allowances is reflected in electricity prices, which have increased above the cost of marginal fuel by the cost of the allowances required for the marginal plant. That means the generating companies make a windfall profit roughly equal to the value of the original allocation (with some variation depending on the change in merit order between coal and gas-fired plant). Newbery (2005b) shows that the prices of EUAs are increasing in the price of gas, for the following simple reason. If gas prices increase, then electricity generators switch out of gasfired plant into coal-fired plant, as shown in figure 3 . This increases the demand for EUAs as coal-fired plant requires almost twice the number of EUAs per MWh generated as modern gas plant. The increased demand with a fixed total supply increases the EUA price, and thus increases the windfall profit of incumbent electricity companies from their free allocation. 
V. Concluding Remarks
Electricity has special features that make the exercise of market power particularly likely, as short-run demand elasticities are very low and even competitive wholesale markets are naturally highly volatile, making the distinction between efficient peak-load pricing and abusive pricing problematic. Electricity is not easily stored and transmission constraints can isolate markets that are not distant from each other. As a result there are many markets across time and space in which generators can plausibly exercise market power.
There are many approaches to estimate the ability of electricity suppliers to exercise market power. Measures of market concentration are often ineffective because companies with modest market shares can have both the ability and incentive to raise prices when markets are tight. Other approaches range from pivotal supplier analysis to sophisticated game-theoretic bidding models of oligopolistic pricing. The FERC pivotal supplier test is relatively simple to apply but can fail to identify the potential for a firm to raise prices significantly above incremental cost. Bidding models can generate accurate predictions of prices under some circumstances, but they do not always match actual outcomes and are difficult to interpret.
Competitive Residual Demand analysis is a relatively simple approach that informs the analysis of market power. The CRD analysis examines the incentive of a firm to increase price above marginal cost when all other firms in a relevant market are acting competitively.
Although CRD is not a complete equilibrium analysis, it is useful to assess the likelihood that a firm will exercise market power. CRD analysis relies on data that are often available and can be repeated relatively easily for different demand conditions and geographic markets.
